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Abstract
We document and account for two facts regarding the relation between international
interest rates and total factor productivity (TFP) in a sample of developing countries. First,
there is a negative correlation between both variables at quarterly frequency. Second, the
share of agricultural labor and interest rates are positively correlated, whereas the share of
agricultural labor and TFP are negatively correlated. Manufacturing labor shows opposite
correlations. These relationships are particularly strong in the aftermath of ﬁnancial crises.
We then construct a model in which the presence of costly intermediation can produce such
relationships. We show that, after increases in interest rates, a requirement to intermediate
factors of production in high productivity sectors, like manufacturing, causes resources to
leave these sectors. Resources end up in low productivity sectors, like agriculture, where
intermediation is cheaper. This lowers aggregate productivity. We show that the channel
we identify is quantitatively important in the case of Korea after the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis.
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11 Introduction
Interest rates and total factor productivity (TFP) in developing countries are inversely corre-
lated. The relationship is particulary strong during recent ﬁnancial crises. As Meza and Quintin
(2006) show, the fall in productivity is a signiﬁcant source of the fall in output in crises. Yet,
the connection between interest rates and productivity remains largely unexplored. Economists
who study extreme events in developing countries have widely ignored this observation. The
falls in productivity after crises are large enough that, when noted, they are often attributed to
measurement error, instead of meriting an explanation in their own right.
In this paper we attack the underlying gap in the literature. We begin by documenting two
facts regarding the relation between international interest rates and total factor productivity
(TFP) in a sample of developing countries. First, there is a negative correlation between both
variables at quarterly frequency. Second, we show that the share of labor in agriculture is
positively correlated with interest rates and negatively correlated with TFP. The manufacturing
labor share shows the opposite correlations. These correlations are especially pronounced in
theaftermathofcrises, whereinterestratesandtheagriculturallaborsharerisesharplyandTFP
experiences large drops. This is consistent with previous work in Benjamin and Meza (2006),
where we show that the large fall in TFP in Korea in 1997 is primarily due to a reallocation of
resources across sectors, from manufacturing to agriculture.
We demonstrate that sectoral differences in intermediating factors of production can ac-
count for the negative correlation between total factor productivity and interest rates. We con-
sider an environment where intermediation costs are higher in manufacturing. In an environ-
ment with such differences, increases in interest rates cause manufacturing sectors to contract
and agricultural sectors to expand. This pattern is consistent with the data. We show further
that the effects demonstrated are signiﬁcant. For the Korean crisis of 1997 they can account for
a substantial portion of the fall in productivity.
1.1 Literature Review
Toourknowledge, thereisnopaperthattriestoaccountforthenegativecorrelationbetweenin-
ternational interest rates and TFP. There are only a few papers that model endogenous changes
in “measured” TFP around major episodes in developing countries. Most that do consider
falls in TFP the result of incorrectly measured capital or labor. Indicative of these is Gertler,
Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003), who attribute the size of the fall in TFP in Korea in 1998 to
a fall in capital utilization. Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003) do not explicitly measure
2capacity utilization. However, Meza and Quintin (2006) show that TFP, measured using data
and adjusted for capital utilization with a model similar to Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci
(2003), falls approximately two thirds as much as unadjusted TFP. In other words, the size of
the fall in TFP remains large.
Our paper is related to research on developing countries and capital returns. Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) document a negative correlation between output and international interest
rates in a sample of developing countries. They show, using a version of the simplest small
open economy model, that country risk can account for most of the empirical regularities of
Argentina during their sample period. We establish an empirical relationship between interest
rates and productivity, and construct a model in which changes in interest rates lead to changes
in TFP.
On the theoretical side, our paper owes a substantial debt to Imrohoroglu and Kumar
(2004). We model ﬁnancial intermediation in the same way they do. They are focused on
the heterogeneity of costs across countries and how capital ﬂows across them. We consider
a small open economy model. Because of this, we are able to derive a relationship between
intermediation and outcomes with homogenous costs over time. This allows us to talk about
changes in productivity within a country, even if intermediation costs themselves do not change
over the relevant time period. We are also able to extend their mechanism to a model with a
competitive labor market, which allows for productivity to depend on labor movements.
We begin with a presentation of facts about interest rates and productivity. We then present
the basic model and derive the basic analytic result. After that, we introduce labor supply in
the model. Finally we conclude with the numerical results.
2 Evidence
In this section we document three facts. First, the real interest rate for international borrowing
and TFP are negatively correlated for a sample of developing countries that have experienced
crises. This is the main fact we are after in this paper. Second, we establish that TFP and
the share of labor in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are correlated both generally
and speciﬁcally, in the aftermath of recent ﬁnancial crises. Finally, we demonstrate that the
costs of intermediating capital are signiﬁcantly higher in the manufacturing sector than in the
agricultural sector for Korea.
The fact at the center of this paper is the correlation between TFP and real interest rates.
We demonstrate that for four of the ﬁve countries discussed in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) a
3negative relationship exists and is strong. We take most of the relevant data from Neumeyer
and Perri (2005), where data sources are fully discussed. The countries we choose are Ko-
rea, Mexico, Philippines, Brazil and Argentina. All ﬁve countries experienced major ﬁnancial
crises within the time period. For Korea, we have national accounts data from 1980 to 2001.
This data captures the crisis that occurred in 1997. For Mexico, the data is between 1980 and
2001. Mexico faced the Tequila Crisis in 1994. The Philippines data covers 1982 to 2001 and
includes the crisis in 1997. Data for Brazil goes from 1991 to 2001 and includes the crisis in
1999. In Argentina the data from 1980 to 2001 includes the crisis in 2001.
To construct real interest rates, we use the nominal rates reported in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) net of inﬂation, which we measure with the United States GDP deﬂator.1 To measure
TFP, we follow Meza and Quintin (2006). They adjust TFP by variations in capital utilization,
using the model of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988). In that model the depreci-
ation rate is a function of the rate of capital utilization. We assume that in the long run the
depreciation rate is 5% on a yearly basis. Labor data in Argentina is not reported quarterly, but
instead reported twice per year. Thus, we measure TFP in Argentina on a yearly basis. In the
case of Argentina, we used data reported in Kehoe (2003).
We present this data in two ways. First we report data on the real interest rates and de-
viations from trend for TFP.2 This is Figure 1. From Figure 1, we highlight the pronounced
negative contemporaneous correlation for Argentina, Korea and Mexico. We also report the
correlation coefﬁcients between TFP’s and lagged interest rates in Figure 2. For Argentina,
Korea and Mexico the coefﬁcient is negative for contemporaneous interest rates and every
lagged value of the interest rate. For the Philippines, lagged interest rates show similar nega-
tive correlations, while contemporaneous interest rates show a small positive correlation.3
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
The relationship between TFP and interest rates is very strong in the immediate aftermath
of a crisis. This particular aspect of the relationship is detailed in Meza and Quintin (2006) who
1We follow the procedure used in Meza and Quintin (2006).
2We use the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to compute deviations from trend. We ﬁrst calculate logarithms of the TFP
series and then use the ﬁlter.
3The negative relationship between TFP and contemporaneous or lagged interest rates does not exist for Brazil.
We posit an explanation. The aggregate labor data for Brazil reported in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) was con-
structed using urban employment and average hours worked in manufacturing. In the data, a large fall in aggregate
labor would contribute to making the TFP fall smaller, as more of the changes in output would be attributed to
labor. This is important because we present a model where labor in the manufacturing sector falls more than
aggregate labor supply, after an increase in interest rates.
4use slightly differing data than what we present. We highlight ﬁve speciﬁc crises and point on
the relationship between interest rates and TFP in these crises. The vertical bars in Figure 1
refer to a year in which a ﬁnancial crisis took place. In four of the ﬁve countries we see sharp
increases in interest rates and sharp falls in TFP.
The second empirical observation we demonstrate is the negative correlation between agri-
cultural employment shares and TFP. In Benjamin and Meza (2006) we have shown that the
primary reason for the fall in TFP during the Korean crisis is a shift in resources from manu-
facturing to agriculture.
Our data source is the International Labour Organization. To construct labor shares by sec-
tor, we use yearly data. Our basic unit of analysis are employment shares in agriculture and
manufacturing.4 We exclude Mexico from our sample because available data does not include
1994, the year in which the Tequila Crisis took place. We begin by examining the behavior of
the labor shares around a crisis. In Figure 3, for each country we report 3 variables: the share
of employment in agriculture relative to total employment, the respective share for manufac-
turing, and the share of agriculture relative to the sum of agriculture and manufacturing. This
last variable is most relevant for the predictions of the model we discuss in the next section. We
mark a crisis year with a vertical bar. For the four countries in our sample, except the Philip-
pines, the employment share in agriculture increases either on the year of or the year after after
the respective ﬁnancial crisis. The opposite happens to the manufacturing share. In the case
of the share of agriculture relative to the sum of agriculture and manufacturing, this variable
increases in the four countries.
That we are constrained to using yearly data may account for the fact that the shares move
either on the year of the crisis or the year after. For example, in the case of Korea, the crisis
occurred in the last quarter of 1997. At the same time, we can see that labor shares react in
1998. The case of the Philippines is similar in terms of timing. In the case of Argentina, the
crisis hit in mid-2001, and the shares react during that year. In Brazil, the crisis took place at
the beginning of 1999, and the shares react during that year.5
[Figure 3 about here]
4We do not construct hours worked because some countries in our sample lack data on hours worked in
agriculture, or have no data for years of ﬁnancial crisis. Since ﬂuctuations in the labor input (aggregate hours
worked) are due, mostly, to changes in the extensive margin, not changes in hours per worker, such additional
detail would not likely change the results.
5Given that we have few observations, we decided not to detrend this data. If the time series were longer, we
would expect to observe a reduction in the agricultural employment share. In the case of Argentina we display
data for 1996-2001 only. Data before 1996 corresponds only to the Greater Buenos Aires region.
5To provide further evidence, we also report correlation coefﬁcients in Table 1. Interest rates
and the share of agricultural employment relative to the sum of agricultural and manufacturing
employment are positively correlated in all countries. Additionally, for every country except
Brazil, the relative size of the agricultural sector is negatively correlated with TFP.6
[Insert Table 1 here]
The third fact we want to establish is that the cost of intermediating capital is larger in
the manufacturing sector than in the agricultural sector in the case of Korea before the 1997
crisis. We posit that this observation is due to the standardized nature of agriculture. Lending
in agriculture tends to be secured by assets that are easy to sell and keep their value if seized.
On the other hand, manufacturing ﬁrms must be frequently and costly reorganized to preserve
value. Agricultural borrowers aim at a homogenized set of products, like seeds and fertilizer.
Manufacturers borrow from a wider range. These attributes should make agriculture partially
easier to intermediate.
Our measurement is limited to Korea for whom we have both a detailed input-output matrix
and ﬁnancial data on loans by industry. The source for the Korean input-output matrix is the
National Statistical Ofﬁce of Korea. The source of ﬁnancial data is the Bank of Korea. We
use data for 1995. Our measure of the intermediation cost per industry is equal to the ratio
of ﬁnancial services provided by the ﬁnance industry to a certain industry, relative to loans
received by that industry. Data on loans includes bank and non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries.
We present two possible denominators, as reported by the Bank of Korea. For both of the
possible choices, intermediation costs are higher in the manufacturing sector. Data is presented
in Table 2.7
[Insert Table 2 here]
3 The Model
We have established the relationship between aggregate TFP and interest rates in a sample of
developing countries. We now show that the presence of costly ﬁnancial intermediation can
account for this relationship. Changes in interest rates affect the implicit costs of using inter-
mediation. The model has two sectors, one agricultural and one manufacturing. We assume,
6This last fact should come as little surprise since TFP is not correlated with contemporaneous interest rates
in Brazil.
7Erosa (2001) measures intermediation costs across countries using input-output matrices. In our case, we
measure intermediation cost across industries within a country.
6as shown in the data, that intermediation costs are more important in manufacturing than agri-
culture. As interest rates rise, intermediation becomes more important and entrepreneurs take
on less productive projects to avoid intermediation. After interest rates rise, resources leave
manufacturing to enter agriculture.
We consider an economy with three kinds of agents. The agents are a consumer, a con-
tinuum of entrepreneurs and a ﬁnancial intermediary (a bank). Of these, the most interesting
decisions are made by entrepreneurs and the bank. We begin by describing entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs live for one period only and are risk neutral. They choose to undertake pro-
duction in one of the two sectors. In their chosen sector, entrepreneurs produce goods from
sector-speciﬁc capital and labor.
Each sector has its own technology. Let us begin with agriculture. Agriculture uses a
simple, standardized technology. Its production is observable and deterministic. All entrepre-
neurs in agriculture have equal productivity. Because of these factors, intermediating capital
is costless in agriculture. The agricultural good is produced using its own capital, ka, with a
technology Y (ka) = Akα
a, where 0 < α < 1 and A > 0.
Manufacturingismorecomplex. Thisisbecauseofthepresenceofriskandofentrepreneur-
speciﬁc human capital. Production is risky in that output can be either high or low and the
entrepreneur can be either a success or a failure. We label the two outcomes in manufacturing,









m if the project fails.
where Ah > A > Al ≥ 0.
Entrepreneurs differ in their skill level in running a manufacturing ﬁrm. An entrepreneur’s
skill level is private information. Each entrepreneur has a type, θ, such that with probability
π(θ) the high outcome occurs. These probabilities are independent across type, of which there
is a continuum of types of measure one. Entrepreneurs are ordered such that π is an increasing,
measurable function, so high types are more likely to be successful manufacturers than low
types. There is a density f(θ) associated with the distribution of types. For simplicity, we
assume f is uniform, so f(θ) = θ.
Thereisidiosyncraticriskinmanufacturing, butnoaggregaterisk. Consumerswhoownthe
capital are risk averse. Because of this, the allocation of capital to entrepreneurs is undertaken
through a bank who can diversify the idiosyncratic risk away from the consumers. Entering
any given period, the bank has acquired a supply of capital from the consumer. It intermediates
7this capital so it can be used in production. Some of this capital is delivered to entrepreneurs.
The rest is sent abroad.
The bank decides what choices to make through negotiations. The bank holds negotiations
with the full continuum of entrepreneurs to allocate capital and pick interest rates. Negotiations
are speciﬁcally over ”contracts,” which we deﬁne as a set of type speciﬁc capital deliveries and
interest rates. Negotiated capital is delivered directly to the entrepreneur, who if successful
makes interest payments. The interest rates that are negotiated are only relevant to successful
entrepreneurs. Unsuccessful entrepreneurs have all of their output seized by the bank. For-
mally, a contracts is: (km(θ),ka(θ),rm(θ),ra(θ)) ∈ <4
+.
After contracts are agreed upon, the entrepreneur chooses which sector to enter and which
pair of promised capital and interest rates to accept. A failure to earn the high return leads to
bankruptcy and the entire output seized by the bank.
Finally, entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector must borrow additionally to pay for the
cost of intermediating capital, which we denote by e. Thus, each period an entrepreneur in
manufacturing borrows e+km from the bank. Both capital and the intermediation costs depre-
ciate completely at the end of the period.
In equilibrium, all types of entrepreneurs are offered the same contract. Pooling across en-
trepreneurs occurs because the uniformity of the bankruptcy policy does not offer any attempts
at screening. Consequently there is no means to prevent low types from imitating higher types
who would otherwise be offered more favorable terms.
We study negotiations that lead to the same outcome as an informationally constrained,
efﬁcient mechanism. The equilibrium contract maximizes total surplus subject to incentive
constraints on the choice of sector by entrepreneurs and a resource constraint. For entrepre-
neurs that choose agriculture the incentive constraint requires higher expected proﬁts in the
agricultural sector than the manufacturing sector. Let A be the set of types that choose agricul-
ture. The incentive constraint is explicitly written as:
Y (ka) − r
aka ≥ π(θ)(Yh(km) − r
m(e + km)) ∀θ ∈ A (1)
For entrepreneurs that choose manufacturing the sign is reversed as they require higher
proﬁts in manufacturing. In equilibrium, for most types, these constraints do not bind. Only
one individual type possesses a constraint which holds in equilibrium with equality. We call
the critical entrepreneur’s type z. Types above the critical value choose manufacturing and
types lower than the critical value choose agriculture. Formally the single incentive constraint
8we subject the negotiations to is:
Y (ka) − r
aka = π(z)(Yh(km) − r
m(e + km)). (2)
To state the problem equilibrium contracts solve, we need a deﬁnition of total surplus. For
a given critical value, z, we write the probability measure for ﬁrms that invest in manufacturing





Those that enter manufacturing and receive a low return have a measure of:
Ψ(z) = 1 − z − Φ(z) =
1 − 2z − z2
2
.
Finally we deﬁne kab to be the capital sent abroad. Total surplus equals revenues from
successes, failures, and capital abroad. Formally total surplus is:
F(z)Y (ka) + Φ(z)Yh(km) + Ψ(z)Yl(km) + r
wkab. (4)
Note that we assume the goods produced in the two sectors are perfect substitutes. This
allows us to talk about productivity differences without explicitly modeling the consumer’s
decisions.8
The resource constraint requires capital in each sector and abroad to equal capital the bank
has to lend, k. It is written as:
kab + F(z)ka + (1 − F(z))(e + km) = k. (5)
The formal negotiations maximize expression (4) over ka,km,kab and z, subject to equa-
tions (2) and (5).
We now solve for the outcome of the negotiations. The bank’s capital, k, affects only
outcomes of capital lent abroad, kab. Variables z, km, and ka are important for studying pro-
ductivity and are entirely determined by the above problem. They are characterized through a
set of three ﬁrst order conditions:
8This assumption is not necessary for productivity differences across sectors to exist in equilibrium. It is













l (km) = r
w (7)
Y (ka) − r
wka = π(z)Yh(km) + (1 − π(z))Yl(km) − r
w(e + km). (8)
The ﬁrst condition describes the agricultural sector, which behaves in the same way as a
small open economy model. The marginal product of capital in the sector equals the world
interest rate. The second condition equates the marginal return on capital in the manufacturing
sector to the return on capital abroad. The ﬁnal condition, (8), determines the optimal division
of entrepreneurs between sectors. Notice that, because of the negative sign on the ﬁnal term,
increasing z spares the entrepreneur some of her intermediation costs.
3.1 The Algebra of TFP
Our goal now is to derive aggregate TFP from the perspective of a statistician who would
assume that all output is produced via a one sector deterministic model. This section is devoted
to its construction.
The statistician’s measure of TFP can be found as follows. If we begin by equating the






















From here it is easy to substitute for the domestically held capital stock, which is:
k
∗ = (1 − z)km + zka.
Combining the two equations yields:
ka =
1











10We can substitute the above expressions for ka and km into our expression for domestically
produced output. From there we can factor out k∗α. Letting domestically produced output








In the appendix, we show that the above expression changes inversely with z, when z
changes due to a change in the interest rate. This leads to our main analytic result, which is
that TFP and interest rates move in opposite directions. Formally our main result is:
Proposition 1. TFP decreases as rw increases.
This result is shown in the appendix. It is an intuitive result. As interest rates rise, the costs
of participating in the manufacturing sector rises for two reasons. First, the cost of borrowing
for intermediation rises. Second, the intermediation costs become more important to ﬁrms
which are borrowing smaller amounts of capital. This leads many manufacturing entrepreneurs
to take up agriculture, thereby lowering aggregate productivity.
4 Extension of the Model: Labor
In this section, we introduce a competitive labor market into the model. Labor is an important
addition because the movement of labor between sectors is more pronounced in the data than
the movement of capital. As we show, the introduction of labor preserves the relationship
between total factor productivity and interest rates. Labor adds realism, but it comes at the
sacriﬁce of analytical results. Hence we present quantitative results which show the channel
presented here can be signiﬁcant.
Labor enters the production function in both sectors. The production functions change to
be of the form Aikα
i l
µ
i . The coefﬁcient on labor, µ, is the same in both sectors and is such
that α + µ < 1. Again, all shares are identical in both sectors. Unlike capital, labor is hired
competitively before output is realized. Different types of manufacturing entrepreneurs can
hire different amounts of labor. We assume that the labor contract is hidden from the bank, so
that the bank cannot infer the ﬁrm’s type from it. Finally, labor must be hired from households
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Z 1
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kab + F(z)ka + (1 − F(z))(km) = k.
The intermediation cost e is a ﬁxed cost. Hence our theory is consistent with any costs
required to undertake business in the manufacturing sector, including intermediation costs and
hiring costs. To allow for these potential interpretations, we subtract the intermediation costs
directly from the realized output at the end of the period.
The model as it currently stands is not closed. In the previous model, the consumer’s
decisions did not affect productivity or any other important outcome of the negotiation. Here,
the inclusion of a labor market requires the wage to be determined in equilibrium. Productivity
depends on wages. Hence we need a maximization decision from the consumer to construct
labor supply. We consider a consumer who supplies a deposit, kt, to the bank in every period.
She is endowed with an initial capital stock, k0. She receives a payment rb
t for each unit of
capital supplied to the bank. We assume complete international capital markets and consider
only perfectly foreseen changes in the interest rate.9 A consumer can buy and sell bonds bt+1,
net debt with respect to the rest of the world, at the world interest rate. She is endowed with
an initial stock of net debt, b0. We denote her consumption in each period ct. Finally, the








ct + bt+1 + kt+1 − (1 + r
w
t+1)bt ≤ wtlst + r
b
tkt∀t.
Parameter 0 < β < 1 represents the discount factor. We close the model with the require-
ment that labor supply equals labor demand (ignoring time subscripts):
9See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for a version of a small open economy model with complete markets
and uncertainty.




With complete capital and bond markets, ct = ¯ c in every period, where ¯ c is endogenous and
constant. Hence, the relevant ﬁrst order condition depends on the within period utility function.
We assume this function is:
u(c,l) = γ ln(c) + ln(L − ls).







This condition closes the model.
4.1 Quantitative Results
We demonstrate the result in this section quantitatively. It is possible to construct a statistician’s
measure of TFP from the model’s domestically produced output, Ydom , domestic capital, k∗,







The rest of this section is devoted to quantitatively assessing the effect of a crisis on TFP.
OurspeciﬁcgoalistoassesstherelevanceofthistheoryintheaftermathoftheKoreanﬁnancial
crisis. We pick Korea because it has the one of the richest macroeconomic datasets for any
country that experienced a recent crisis.
The model has relatively few parameters and most are standard to the calibration of macro-
economic models. The usual macroeconomic parameters include the coefﬁcients in the pro-
duction function and the sectorial TFP’s. The parameters speciﬁc to our model are related to
intermediation costs and the variance of output in the model’s manufacturing sector.
Before we select parameters, we discuss how the less standard parameters affect outcomes.
One of these is the intermediation cost, e. The larger the intermediation cost e, the stronger the
key relationships are. If e = 0 then TFP and interest rates are unrelated.
Similarly, important to this analysis is the variance of expected productivity in manufactur-
ing. In equilibrium, densities whose expected productivity lead to a substantial mass directly
above the critical type, z, produce large effects. Densities which spread the mass out thinly
13produce small effects. For example, with a uniform density, the further apart Al and Ah are,
the smaller the key relationships are.
Now we are ready to select speciﬁc parameter values. To measure the change in TFP we
need six observations from the data. Namely, we use measures of productivity in each sector,
the aggregate capital and labor share, the intermediation cost and hours worked per capita.
We follow Quintin and Amaral (2005) in choosing the labor share as the residual of pay-
ments to entrepreneurs and capital in National Product Accounts. Speciﬁcally, we choose the
share for rents of national income to entrepreneurs directly from their calculations, noting that
it is a value computed from US data. Other researchers, such as Young (1995), have found
income shares for Korea that are very similar to the ones in the US.
For the productivities in the manufacturing sector, we begin by setting Al equal to zero.10
Setting Al equal to zero allows us to solve the labor allocation problem in the manufacturing
sector analytically.11
Both Ah and A are taken from Benjamin and Meza (2006). We measured Ah using a Cobb-
Douglas production function and data on capital, labor and GDP for the manufacturing sector
in Korea in 1995. In the model we match this number to the unweighed average productivity
of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. We measured A following a similar procedure for the
agricultural sector in Korea.12
We choose
γ
¯ c to match a ratio of working time ls to time available for work L equal to 33%.
This value is close to the ratio in Korean data in 1995, which is 30%. We choose L arbitrarily
to equal 40.
For quantitative purposes, we associate intermediation costs exclusively with the ﬁnancial
intermediation of capital. For intermediation costs, we make the model match the ratio of in-
termediation costs to loans in 1995. Since in the data our measure of intermediation costs in
agriculture is positive, whereas in the model the cost is zero, we subtract the ratio of interme-
diation costs in agriculture from the manufacturing one. Note that loans in the model equal
e + km. Thus, the model counterpart of our measure of intermediation costs is e/(e + km).
Setting this expression equal to the intermediation cost in the data determines a value for e.
We summarize the chosen values in Table 3.
10Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) make a similar assumption in their quantitative work.
11This assumption creates a large variance between the expected outcome of successful and unsuccessful ﬁrms.
In the data, failures and successes are closer together. Aw, Ching, and Roberts (2003) report productivity differ-
ences of unsuccessful and successful manufacturing ﬁrms to be around 25%.
12We are using a constant returns to scale function to measure the productivities. Our model has decreasing
returns in each technology.
14[Table 3 about here]
The experiment we consider involves an interest rate shock identical to the one that hit the
Korean economy at the end of 1997. The average international interest rate faced by Korea
increased from 3.6% to 8% between the ﬁrst three quarters of 1997 and 1997:IV-1998. Results
are reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
The annual data on TFP for Korea reported in the empirical section shows that detrended
TFP fell by 4.1% between 1997 and 1998. The fall in TFP in the model is 3.6%. Thus, the
model can account for 88% of the fall. We take this result as suggestive that the channel we
have identiﬁed in our simple model plays a signiﬁcant role in the fall in TFP.
Qualitatively, the model also predicts the labor factor reallocation that occurred in the data
and reported in the empirical section. We focus on the ratio of agricultural labor relative to the
sum of agriculture and manufacturing labor. In the data, the labor share in agriculture increased
by 4.4 percentage points, from 33.7% to 38.1%. In the model the share increases, also by four
percentage points.
The largest gap between the data and the model are the sizes of the agricultural and manu-
facturing sector before the crisis. This is an artifact of the low value of agricultural productivity
and the uniform density for manufacturing productivities. Together they posit that the vast ma-
jority of the agents in the economy are productive enough in the manufacturing sector that they
can afford to pay the higher costs associated with that sector. A distribution where a substantial
number of agents had a productivity advantage in agriculture (or were similarly productive in
both sectors) would improve the performance of the model in this dimension.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we ﬁrst document a relationship between real international interest rates and TFP.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that reports such correlation. TFP was measured
taking into account variable capital utilization, thus eliminating a usual suspect for the fall in
productivity. We also present evidence that both the fall in TFP and interest rates are correlated
with a shift of labor from manufacturing to agriculture. This shift in labor produces changes
in TFP, as labor moves from a high productivity sector, manufacturing, to a low productivity
sector, agriculture.
We then present a simple model that accounts for the negative correlation between real in-
terest rates and TFP. The model has a mechanism that makes resources move from a highly pro-
15ductive industry to one with lower productivity in the face of a rise in interest rates. The mech-
anism is relevant because it focuses on one of the salient features of developing economies,
high intermediation costs. It is also tractable in that it lends itself to qualitative results. In order
to test the predictions of our simple model, we focus on the Korean 1997 ﬁnancial crises. We
assign parameter values that are consistent with data from pre-crisis Korea. We then measure
how much TFP would change given increases in the international interest rate. We ﬁnd that
our mechanism can account for a large amount of the fall in the data.
We consider our results as pointing to a promising explanation of changes in TFP in de-
veloping countries, in particular around important events such as ﬁnancial crises: factor real-
location. However, our quantitative results are limited in that they are sensitive to modeling
assumptions that we have made and from parameter values that are difﬁcult to pin down. For
example, the numerical results are aided by the decision to model intermediation as a ﬁxed
cost. If these costs were modeled as having a constant returns component in addition to the
ﬁxed costs, their inﬂuence on equilibrium outcomes would be smaller.
Even with a smaller quantitative impact, the presence of costly ﬁnancial intermediation
produces changes in aggregate productivity and resource allocation that are qualitatively simi-
lar to those that occur in developing countries in the midst of crises. Given the large shifts in
resources from manufacturing to agriculture that have occurred after some crises, in particular
Korea 1997 and Argentina 2001, avoiding expensive intermediation is a serious mechanism for
understanding an important trend.
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6 Appendix: Proof
The proof consists of two lemmas. The ﬁrst lemma does not deal with TFP directly. For
this lemma, we show, that z is monotone increasing in rw. Intuitively, the ﬁrst lemma holds
because an increase in the world interest rate increases the costs of borrowing the amount e.
Furthermore, increased interest rates also reduce the scale of projects. Due to both of the above
reasons, avoiding intermediation costs becomes more important and greater investment in the
agricultural sector occurs. Mechanically, the ﬁrst lemma is a traditional comparative static
resulton theincentiveconstraintfor themarginaltype z. Most ofthework ofdemonstratingthe
lemma consists of substituting variables that are not z out of the particular incentive constraint.
The lemma itself holds to more generality than we have previously used in deﬁning the model.
We show the lemma in its generality here. That is, we prove this lemma with a general density
f and probability function π.
17Lemma 1. Suppose that
R x
0 f(x)π(x)dx is differentiable for all x and that the density, f, and
the cumulative distribution function, F, are also differentiable. Suppose also that the density,
f, possesses an increasing monotone hazard ratio (
F(x)
f(x) increases as x increases). Then the
investment threshold is monotone increasing in r.
Proof. Recall that the investment threshold is characterized by (6-8).
Our ﬁrst step is to look for expressions for ka and km in terms of z.








Now we need to ﬁnd km. We can do this both for general densities and for the speciﬁc











Because of our assumptions, this term is increasing for both general probability measures and
the speciﬁc case of the uniform distribution. It also appears in the ﬁrst order condition on
manufacturing capital as is the de facto TFP term for that sector.
Finally, deﬁne h(z) = π(z)Ah+(1 − π(z))Al. In the uniform case this term is again linear.
In all cases it corresponds to the TFP term for the marginal ﬁrm remaining in the manufacturing
sector, z.
Rearranging the threshold equation yields:
Y (ka) − r
wka + r
we = π(z)Yh(km) + (1 − π(z))Yl(km) − r
wkm.
The next step is to add our redeﬁned terms to the above expression and substitute out ka
















where A∗ is a positive collection of parameters. Factoring out r
w α









18It is obvious that the LHS increases as rw increases. What we require for the lemma to
be true is that the RHS increases in z. It is not difﬁcult to show that the RHS behaves as
desired. Both g(z) and h(z) increase in z for general densities, because π is increasing and the
assumption on the monotone hazard ratio. Hence it is sufﬁcient for the parenthetical term on
the RHS to be positive. However this follows since all other multiplicative terms (the LHS and
the other terms on the RHS) are positive.
We have established a positive correlation between rw and the measure of ﬁrms in the
agricultural sector, indexed by z. The second lemma shows there is a negative correlation
between the measure of ﬁrms in the agricultural sector and the level of TFP. For this lemma,
the assumption of a uniform density is important as we rely on previous algebra. The proof
makes the following argument. If TFP increased in z, entrepreneurs who choose low values of
z could increase total surplus to the negotiators by raising the marginal type z and saving on
the expenditures of intermediation costs.
Lemma 2. Suppose z increases through a shock to rw. Then TFP decreases.
Proof. The result follows by contradiction. Fix two values of rw. Associate with these values
two values for TFP. Call them TFP1 and TFP2 and suppose TFP1 ≥ TFP2 and that
z1 > z2. It follows by the previous lemma that r1 > r2.
Let allocation 1 be the choice of ka,km,kab,z and k∗ when the interest rate equals r1 and let
allocation 2 be that choice for interest rate r2. To ﬁx notation, let numerical subscripts refer to
the allocation the element belongs to. Also let x1 refer to allocation 1 and x2 refer to allocation
2.
We will construct a feasible and incentive compatible allocation that produces higher total
surplus than x2. Consider the following alternative allocation in the event the interest rate
equals interest rate 2. Allocate ka3 and km3 such that for z1,
A











Also let kab3 = kab2 + e(z1 − z2) and z3 = z1.
Let’s refer to this allocation as allocation 3 or x3 Note that allocation 3 clearly satisﬁes the
resource constraint. Note further that there are interest rates ra
3 and rm
3 such that this allocation
19is incentive compatible. (There are an inﬁnite number of pairs of such interest rates). Allo-
cation 3 also produces a higher total surplus than allocation 2, because domestically produced
output equals TFP(z)k∗α and by our previous algebra TFP (z3)) equals TFP(z1). By our
assumption TFP(z1) ≥ TFP(z2).
Hence x3 is a superior allocation to x2. But this contradicts the assumption that x2, solved
the negotiation problem when the interest rate was r2.
20Table 1: Correlations with the Relative Share of Agricultural Labor
Country Korea Argentina Philippines Brazil
Correlation Between Agriculture and Interest Rates 0.72 0.77 0.44 0.88
Correlation Between Agriculture and TFP. -0.79 -0.90 -0.19 0.34
Table 2: Intermediation Costs: Financial Services Used Relative to Loans
Measure of Loans Intermediation Costs in Agriculture Intermediation Costs in Manufacturing
Loans 0.028 0.062
Loans+Equipment Funds 0.048 0.074
Table 3: Parameter Values
Parameter α µ A Ah Al e
γ
¯ c
Value 0.3 0.4 0.056 0.203 0 0.169 1.65
Table 4: Generated Values After an Increase in the Interest Rate
Observation Change in TFP Labor share in agriculture before Labor share after
Model 3.6 % 2.6% 6.6 %
Data 4.1 % 33.7% 38.1%
21Figure 1: TFP and Interest Rates
22Figure 2: Correlations Between Interest Rates and Various Lags of TFP
23Figure 3: Labor Shares Around Crises
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